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Bridging the resource-based view and the institutional perspective, this study explores the
performance consequences of ﬁrms’ alliance partner selections by examining the interactions
of resource complementarity and institutional associations (reﬂected through both societal and
network status) between the ﬁrm and its partners. The integrative framework suggests that a
joint consideration of resource complementarity and status effects, as well as important ﬁrm- and
environmental-level contingent factors, are critical for understanding the underlying mechanisms
of alliance formations and their effects on ﬁrm performance. Further, our study suggests that it
is necessary to consider both societal and network status as they can have distinct effects under
certain conditions. Our analyses of four U.S. industries (computer, steel, pharmaceutics, crude
petroleum and natural gas) over a span of 13 years largely support our framework. Copyright
 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
How are resources exchanged and status utilized
between partners in strategic alliances? What are
the performance implications of such exchange
mechanisms for parent ﬁrms? The economic ratio-
nale for resource needs and the sociological jus-
tiﬁcation for status seeking represent two major
streams of research in strategic alliances, espe-
cially in the partner selection process. Researchers
who subscribe to the resource-based view (RBV)
argue that resources of particular interest in
alliances include ﬁnancial capital, technical capa-
bilities, managerial capabilities, and other relevant
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assets (Hitt et al., 2000). Partners should be sufﬁ-
ciently differentiated to provide missing elements
or new/complementary capabilities (Osborn and
Hagedoorn, 1997). Firms search for alliance part-
ners with resources that they can leverage and
integrate to create synergy (Das, Sen, and Sen-
gupta, 1998; Lin, Yang, and Demirkan, 2007).
Researchers who rely on the institutional per-
spective instead argue for a normative rationality
of partner selection, contending that alliances are
formed for the conformity of social justiﬁcation
and social obligation (Zukin and Dimaggio, 1990).
In particular, an economic actor’s performance in
the marketplace is affected by the status level of its
close associates (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Podolny,
1994). Alliances are often developed to enhance a
ﬁrm’s own status and image by tapping into the
reputation of more established partners (Hitt et al.,
2000).
Although the above theories provide valuable
explanations for partner selection in alliances,
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they are often treated separately or as mutu-
ally exclusive views without much interaction.
Alliances are depicted as either a route to ﬁnancial
or physical resource access or a form of seek-
ing status support in the institutional environ-
ment. The economic rationality of RBV focuses
on value-maximizing choices that are constrained
by imperfect information and uncertainty about
future outcomes, while the normative rationality
of the institutional perspective emphasizes value-
laden choices that are constrained by social context
and may be vulnerable to economic suboptimiza-
tion (Oliver, 1997: 701–702). Given that ﬁrms
may seek both resources and status in one alliance,
it is intriguing how ﬁrms approach these seemingly
divergent needs and how the exchange of these
needs may affect ﬁrm performance. To the best of
our knowledge, this topic has rarely been exam-
ined both theoretically and empirically in the liter-
ature. Our study intends to address these important
gaps and investigate how the interaction between
resource and status in alliance relations impacts
parent ﬁrm performance. In doing so, we suggest
that these two perspectives complement rather than
compete with each other, though with different
emphases.
In addition, while there is a general recogni-
tion of the importance of status in ﬁrms’ institu-
tional associations, there is much less understand-
ing or agreement regarding what actually consti-
tutes a ﬁrm’s status. A ﬁrm’s institutional context
includes forces from the state, society, and inter-
ﬁrm relations that deﬁne socially acceptable eco-
nomic behavior (Oliver, 1997). Prior research gen-
erally has not differentiated the multiple aspects of
status, or simply assumed them to be identical in
nature. Most studies in sociology and strategy have
also deﬁned status as a reﬂection of a ﬁrm’s posi-
tion in interﬁrm relations, in particular with the use
of eigenvector centrality, rather than its standing in
the state and society (Baum et al., 2005; Jensen,
2003; Podolny, 1993). We believe such treatment
of status may not reﬂect its complex nature. This
study extends research in this area by differen-
tiating two types of status: societal and network
status. Societal status refers to the ranking of social
esteem that is ascribed by society and constructed
on the basis of various criteria, such as social
responsibility, ﬁnancial soundness, innovation, and
so on (Washington and Zajac, 2005; Weber, 1978),
while network status denotes a ﬁrm’s positional
standing in its interﬁrm relations (Podolny, 1993).
Our study shows that this differentiation is critical
theoretically and has performance implications.
Finally, in addition to exploring the interac-
tions between resource complementarity and sta-
tus associations in alliance relations, we further
argue that there are boundary conditions for their
respective main effects. Speciﬁcally, environmen-
tal dynamism and ﬁrm age can act as important
moderating factors for us to understand the rela-
tionships among resources, status, and ﬁrm perfor-
mance.
In this study, we identify a large sample from
four U.S. industries (computer, steel, pharmaceu-
tics, crude petroleum and natural gas) over a span
of 13 years (1988–2000). This sample gives us
a good opportunity to study interorganizational
alliances in a broad range of industrial contexts.
By analyzing their alliance data and parent ﬁrm
performance, we ﬁnd that what matters in these
alliances rests on not only resource considerations,
but also institutional explanations.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
RBV, with a strong emphasis on economic ratio-
nality, concentrates on the development of resource
bundles and tends to bypass the dynamic process of
interactions between organizations and their insti-
tutional environments, which impose a legitimacy
requirement for ﬁrms. In contrast, the institutional
perspective shows that interorganizational linkages
are motivated by exogenous pressures for legiti-
macy, although it may require the incorporation
of RBV to help determine whether the combina-
tion of resources that ﬁrms have assembled in the
institutional environment correlates with ﬁrm-level
performance (Oliver, 1997). The integration of the
institutional perspective and RBV thus makes it
possible to investigate whether or not afﬁliations
between peers with both complementary resources
and intangible organizational attributes such as sta-
tus yield larger payoffs.
Resource-based view on alliances
RBV is ﬁrm focused and concerned with the man-
agement of internal resources for achieving com-
petitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
Since resources are heterogeneously distributed
across ﬁrms, this perspective recognizes that some
important internal resources can be obtained from
Copyright  2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 30: 921–940 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/smjAlliance Partners and Firm Performance 923
external sources via interorganizational relation-
ships such as alliances, or by engaging in mergers
and acquisitions. In contrast, resource dependence
theory focuses on external sources as a means for
obtaining resources critical to organizational sur-
vival and prosperity (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
The rationale for strategic alliances from RBV
is distinct from resource dependence theory, as
alliances are viewed as vehicles that not only pro-
vide access to other ﬁrms’ valuable resources, but
also present an opportunity for maximizing rents
through the ﬁrm’s own internal resources.
Scholars have adopted RBV to better understand
the characteristics of the partners that ﬁrms choose
to ally with (Das and Teng, 2000). RBV suggests
that alliances are formed for the value-creation
potential of pooled resources. In their study on
alliance partner selection decisions, Hitt et al.
(2000) found support for resource-based reasoning.
In particular, developed market ﬁrms sought part-
ners with complementary resource endowments
such as local market knowledge and access to
distribution channels, which offered potential for
strategic development. Similarly, emerging mar-
ket ﬁrms sought partners that helped them secure
access to resources that they lacked, namely ﬁnan-
cial and technical resources, and strategic posi-
tions in the marketplace. Alliances enable sharing
of complementary resources among ﬁrms, making
synergy creation possible.
Although RBV provides a reasonable and solid
rationale for choosing alliance partners, it mainly
examines the partner selection process from an
economic perspective, which emphasizes the efﬁ-
ciency of combining complementary resources.
Consequently, there is a lack of sufﬁcient consid-
eration of external institutional inﬂuences (Oliver,
1997). Failure to acknowledge ﬁrms’ embedded-
ness in their institutional environments may impose
serious theoretical problems as ﬁrms increasingly
demand both economic and social resources. We
believe that this gap may be better ﬁlled by incor-
porating the institutional perspective.
Institutional perspective on alliances
Firm behavior is embedded in a broader political,
economic, and social context, and so are ﬁrms’
alliances (Dacin, Ventresca, and Beal, 1999). Firms
respond to environmental constraints by seeking
recognition and legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to
the level of social acceptability bestowed upon a
set of activities or actors (Dowling and Pfeffer,
1975). An organization is more likely to survive,
obtain resources, and justify its rights and com-
petence if it is endowed with legitimacy (Baum
and Oliver, 1991). In other words, legitimacy
can provide critical social resources that facilitate
and complement ﬁnancial and physical resources.
While legitimacy is important to all ﬁrms, it is
more so for small or young ﬁrms that need to estab-
lish themselves in their own business environments
or enter a new business domain, due to their liabil-
ity of newness or smallness (Carroll, 1983; Hannan
and Freeman, 1977).
Legitimacy can be procured through ﬁrms’
social activities, technical recognition, and asso-
ciated partners. Though institutional-legitimacy
researchers depict legitimacy as a set of constitu-
tive beliefs that organizations cannot extract from
the environment, strategic-legitimacy researchers
maintain that organizations can view legitimacy as
an operational resource, which can be extracted
competitively from the environment (Suchman,
1995). Organizations can actively conform, select,
manipulate, and create norms and practices to
gain legitimacy. One of the effective ways to
enhance ﬁrm legitimacy is through strategic
alliances (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996).
Oliver (1990) argued that ﬁrms enter interorga-
nizational relationships to enhance their legiti-
macy by improving their reputation or congru-
ence with prevailing norms in the institutional
environment.
Firms also seek to improve their status in their
institutional environments. By status, we refer to,
‘a socially constructed, intersubjectively agreed-
upon and accepted ordering or ranking of indi-
viduals, groups, organizations, or activities in a
social system’ (Washington and Zajac, 2005: 284).
It reﬂects an actor’s relative standing in a group
based on prestige, honor, and deference (Thye,
2000). Status is a socially constructed concept that
may not always be economically rational. It dif-
fers from the economic notion of reputation, which
is derived from perceived quality (for details see
Washington and Zajac, 2005). In the economic
models of reputation, investments in product qual-
ity at one point in time will convey information
about the current quality and affect subsequent
market opportunities over time, whereas socio-
logical models of status emphasize social justi-
ﬁcation and capture differences in social ranks
that generate privilege or discrimination (Benjamin
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and Podolny, 1999; Washington and Zajac, 2005).
Although a reputation for quality can inﬂuence
ﬁrms’ status, ‘the status ordering helps to deter-
mine which ﬁrms will develop reputations for qual-
ity and which will not’ (Benjamin and Podolny,
1999: 585).
Status ordering can come from multiple sources
as a ﬁrm’s institutional context comprises forces
in state, society, and interorganizational relation-
ships. In particular, we differentiate two types of
status: societal and network status. Societal sta-
tus refers to the social ranking of esteem that is
ascribed by the society on the basis of a ﬁrm’s
conformity to social norms: social responsibil-
ity, ﬁnancial soundness, innovativeness, long-term
investment value, ability to attract and keep tal-
ented people, wise use of corporate assets, and
so on. Network status refers to a ﬁrm’s positional
ranking in its interﬁrm networks. The former con-
cerns a ﬁrm’s standing in a social hierarchy as
determined by respect and deference, while the
latter concerns a ﬁrm’s inﬂuence in interﬁrm rela-
tionships (Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac,
2005).
The differentiation of these two types of status
is meaningful and important; however, researchers
tend to predominantly pay attention to network sta-
tus, with Bonacich’s (1987) eigenvector centrality
in an interﬁrm network being a widely used mea-
sure of status in prior works (Baum et al., 2005;
Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993). A ﬁrm’s eigenvec-
tor centrality captures its central position in a net-
work in terms of the ‘global’ or ‘overall’ structure
of the network. A ﬁrm has a high network sta-
tus ‘to the extent that it maintains strong ties with
other ﬁrms that have network status because they
maintain strong ties with other ﬁrms that have net-
work status and so on’ (Jensen, 2003: 481). This
network status may not reﬂect whether ﬁrms have
a high social standing in terms of acceptance in the
society. For instance, Nike could have a high net-
work status as it is highly embedded in its interﬁrm
relationships during the process of product out-
sourcing; however, Nike has often been criticized
by the press for its lack of social responsibility
and may not be admired by the public. Its subcon-
tracted factories have used child labor and paid
scant wages to workers who are working in unsafe
and unprotected environments; therefore, Nike’s
societal status may not necessarily correspond to
its network status.
Status,1 reputation, and legitimacy are not com-
peting speciﬁcations of organizational identity;
rather, they are complementary to each other (Rao,
1994; Washington and Zajac, 2005); ‘if models
of reputation emphasize a tight coupling between
endowments and evaluations, then models of legit-
imacy direct attention to the collective processes
by which reputation is created and sustained’
(Rao, 1994: 30–31). To some extent, a legit-
imized status may generate a favorable reputation
through endorsement and cognitive validation. In
this study, we view status as not only the manifes-
tation of ﬁrms’ reputation and legitimacy but also
the means for ﬁrms to further enhance reputation
and legitimacy for resource and economic gains,
in particular in alliance relationships.
Toward a theoretical integration
Both RBV and the institutional perspective offer
motivations for strategic alliances; however, each
has a very different emphasis. The institutional per-
spective is concerned with the alignment process of
organizations and their institutional environments,
while RBV focuses on the development of unique
resources bundles. Environment, from the perspec-
tive of RBV, is a place for exchanging products
and services that enable organizations to create
sustained competitive advantages, while according
to the institutional perspective, environment is an
embodiment of rules and requirements to which
individual organizations must conform if they are
to receive support and legitimacy (Scott, 1987).
According to RBV, alliances are used to absorb
and develop necessary and distinct resources to
build sustained competitive advantages, while the
institutional view takes alliance as a method to
achieve alignment with environments, win recog-
nition, and gain legitimacy. On the one hand, RBV
emphasizes economic rationality, while, on the
other hand, the institutional view advocates a nor-
mative rationality, which emphasizes the role of
historical precedent and social justiﬁcation (Oliver,
1997). At ﬁrst sight, it seems that these two per-
spectives are at odds; however, RBV and the insti-
tutional perspective are not mutually exclusive and
can be integrated to shed new light on strategic
alliances.
1 Hereafter the single term ‘status’ refers to both societal and
network status if not otherwise speciﬁed.
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The institutional perspective complements and
consolidates RBV in three aspects. First, from a
broader view of resources, both reputation and
legitimacy are integral and valuable assets to
ﬁrms (Barney, 1991; Hall, 1992). Second, status
has been shown to facilitate resource exchanges
(e.g., Granovetter, 1985). Reputation and legiti-
macy invite and generate continuous resource sup-
plies from the environments. Third, institutional
reputation and legitimacy lead to enhanced strate-
gic position and are necessary for establishing sus-
tainable competitive advantages.
Integrated and valuable assets
Reputation and legitimacy are considered as insep-
arable assets of organizations. A positive repu-
tation is a valuable and intangible asset, which
generates rents for ﬁrms (Fombrun and Shanley,
1990); thus, we would like to reexamine reputa-
tion and legitimacy through the lens of RBV in
terms of its four classic indicators (valuable, rare,
imperfectly imitable, and substitutable).
First, resources are valuable when ﬁrms exploit
opportunities or neutralize threats in an environ-
ment (Barney, 1991). Reputation and legitimacy
can be reﬂected through a ﬁrm’s status and har-
monize a ﬁrm’s relationships with its environment.
Speciﬁcally, a high status allows a ﬁrm to be more
acceptable by other institutional players and invites
more chances to cooperate, while extracting more
economic rent from alliance relationships (Stuart,
2000). Second, if a particularly valuable resource is
not possessed by many ﬁrms, this kind of resource
has the potential to generate a competitive advan-
tage (Barney, 1991). Reputation and legitimacy are
heterogeneously distributed among ﬁrms in one
industry. In most cases, the status structure has
a pyramidal shape in terms of accessibility and
control of such resources, and only a few play-
ers will enjoy high reputation (Lin, 1999). The
rarity of such resources also makes a high-status
ﬁrm more sought after by potential partners, in
the hope of advancing their reputation and legiti-
macy. Third, ‘valuable and rare resources can only
be sources of sustained competitive advantage if
ﬁrms that do not possess these resources cannot
obtain them’ (Barney, 1991: 107, italics in origi-
nal). Barney (1991) argued that a ﬁrm’s reputation
among customers and suppliers falls into the cat-
egory of social complexity, which is beyond the
ability of other ﬁrms to systematically imitate.
Fourth, ‘the last requirement for a ﬁrm resource
to be a source of sustained competitive advantage
is that there must be no strategically equivalent
valuable resources that are themselves either not
rare or imitable’ (Barney, 1991:111). Without
reputation and legitimacy, ﬁrms will have a very
hard time competing in the market. Though other
ﬁrms can also forge alliances with high-status
partners, a valuable resource such as reputation is
r a r ea n dh a r dt oi m i t a t e .
Attracting and generating continuous resource
supply
Baum and Oliver (1991) contended that by asso-
ciations with organizations that already possess
high legitimacy or the conferral of more speciﬁc
resources and endorsements, a ﬁrm can obtain
resources and social support through the establish-
ment of helpful institutional linkages. Such link-
ages enhance the public image of the focal ﬁrm
and increase its attractiveness as a candidate for
future cooperation. Organizations, by aligning with
their environments, win support from their com-
munities, customers, competitors, and stakehold-
ers as well. With reduced environmental threats,
such legitimacy is crucial to unleashing external
resource ﬂows, especially for those ﬁrms in poor
neighborhoods (Wiewel and Hunter, 1985). Rep-
utation and legitimacy thus can generate a con-
tinuous ﬂow of resource supply on which ﬁrms’
sustained competitive advantage is based.
Enhanced strategic position
Dyer and Singh (1998) stressed the value of
interﬁrm relationships for accessing resources and
creating competitive advantages. Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven (1996) mentioned that enhanced
legitimacy improves the strategic position of ﬁrms.
The relations with high-status ﬁrms will generate
ﬁrm visibility, signal increased status to their cus-
tomers, buyers, and suppliers (Stuart, 2000), and
help distinguish ﬁrms from competitors (Eisen-
hardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). This kind of recog-
nition is necessary for drawing organizations closer
to resources and reducing the search and mon-
itoring costs associated with ﬁnding a partner,
lowering the overall transaction costs involved
(Williamson, 1975).
The above reexamination of institutional con-
cerns in alliance partner selections unequivocally
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shows that positive institutional relations not only
constitute special assets for ﬁrms competing in
the market, but also ensure the future resource
supply and improve strategic positions. The intan-
gible beneﬁts of reputation and legitimacy are con-
cretized into and interact with resource needs in
strategic alliance to enhance ﬁrms’ competitive
advantages.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we intend to develop hypotheses for
the integrative framework and illustrate the impor-
tance of a joint consideration of both resources and
status. Our focus is not to investigate the respective
role of each, but rather to examine their interaction
effects and boundary conditions.
Interactions of resource complementarity and
partner status on ﬁrm performance
Firms may be able to enhance their own standing
through associations with partners of high soci-
etal or network status. In alliance relations, the
selections of partners may inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s capa-
bilities as well as others’ perceptions of its capa-
bilities (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000).
It is of vital importance for low-status ﬁrms to
form alliances if the quality of their products is
difﬁcult to evaluate. It is generally assumed that
it is easier to observe the afﬁliation relationship
than to observe differences in quality (Benjamin
and Podolny, 1999). Stuart (1998) contended that a
technology alliance with a high-status organization
is a public endorsement of another ﬁrm’s products
or quality. A ﬁrm’s important constituents (cus-
tomers, the ﬁnancial community, the media, etc.)
will view having a large or high-status alliance
partner as an endorsement of its quality (Stuart,
Hoang, and Hybels, 1999).
In addition to the effect of institutional endorse-
ment, afﬁliation with high societal or network sta-
tus partners will allow a ﬁrm’s access to some
knowledge pools that cannot be easily obtained
in the market. Knowledge spillover is possible
through daily interactions, as social ties purvey
access to information possessed by one’s contacts
(Burt, 1992). Consequently, alliances with high-
status partners will make it possible for a ﬁrm to
access other kinds of resources within the network
of those high-status partners (Stuart, 2000).
Although allying with partners of high societal
or network status may lead to beneﬁts in institu-
tional endorsement and resource ﬂows, this prac-
tice may be challenged when there is little or
no resource complementarity from the partners. A
sole emphasis on institutional linkages rather than
economic efﬁciency can dampen ﬁrm performance.
First, there is a high cost associated with allying
with high-status partners. Firms of high status tend
to be very selective (and can afford to be so in most
cases) in their choice of alliance partners because
their status or economic returns will be in danger if
they are associated with disreputable partners (Stu-
art, 2000). Firms wanting to ally with high-status
partners may have to go through rigorous investi-
gations and negotiations that add signiﬁcant cost
to business transactions.
Second, the ultimate purpose of alliances is to
leverage ﬁrm resources along with the complemen-
tary resources of partner ﬁrms to create synergy
effects. Without the synergy effect (1 + 1 > 2),
ﬁrms may not be able to create positive per-
formance with high-status partners if the high
transaction cost is also considered. Mounting evi-
dence shows that combining partner resources pro-
motes the sharing of cost and risk as well as
product development, while increasing speed to
market (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). Hamel,
Doz, and Prahalad (1989) suggested that ﬁrms can
achieve mutual gains if partners can complement
each other’s weakness. By pooling complemen-
tary skills, small ﬁrms with speciﬁc technical skills
and larger ﬁrms with experience in development
could produce products faster and cheaper than
either ﬁrm could do alone (Deeds and Hill, 1996).
We argue that the positive interaction between
resource complementarity and status (societal or
network) will bring better performance to the
ﬁrm.
Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, a high degree
of resource complementarity with alliance part-
ners will be positively associated with a ﬁrm’s
performance when the partners also have high
societal status.
Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris paribus, a high degree
of resource complementarity with alliance part-
ners will be positively associated with a ﬁrm’s
performance when the partners also have high
network status.
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Interactions of resource complementarity and
own status on ﬁrm performance
RBV suggests that ﬁrms have to depend on
resources to develop competitive advantages. Con-
sequently, complementary resources from alliance
partners will enhance a ﬁrm’s competitive advan-
tages. In the meantime, ﬁrms also need to rely
on institutional support to establish themselves in
institutional environments. Both kinds of depen-
dency are crucial to ﬁrms’ survival. We argue that
resource complementary and institutional depen-
dency can complement and substantiate each other,
since resource endowments lay a good foundation
for ﬁrms to gain legitimacy in institutional envi-
ronments, and institutional recognition also leads
to increased resources for ﬁrms. Low societal or
network status ﬁrms encounter greater challenges
in obtaining necessary resources from their envi-
ronment. Complementary resources, if any, from
alliance partners will greatly boost the perfor-
mance of low-status ﬁrms. Conversely, high-status
ﬁrms may have already enjoyed a steady supply
of resources from their environment. The marginal
effect of additional complementary resources may
be minimal for these high-status ﬁrms. In addition,
their past success may become a competency trap
(Levitt and March, 1988) and motivate them to rely
on established routines, policies, and procedures
that allow for little or no additional learning from
complementary partners (Hoang and Rothaermel,
2005).
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, a high degree of
resource complementarity with alliance partners
will improve the performance of a ﬁrm with low
rather than high societal status.
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, a high degree of
resource complementarity with alliance partners
will improve the performance of a ﬁrm with low
rather than high network status.
Interactions of status asymmetry and own
status on ﬁrm performance
In addition to resource complementarity, status
asymmetry with alliance partners can be an impor-
tant predictor of ﬁrm performance. We argue that
a large difference in status between the ﬁrm and
its partners will have varying effects for ﬁrms with
different own status. Speciﬁcally, low-status ﬁrms
will beneﬁt more from a large status asymmetry.
The institutional endorsement and resource ﬂows
are more critically needed by low-status ﬁrms in
alliances. Low-status ﬁrms face the liability of
smallness and newness (Carroll, 1983; Hannan and
Freeman, 1977). Critical institutional support and
resource ﬂow cannot be obtained from their peers;
allying with partners that have dramatically higher
status will signiﬁcantly elevate the focal ﬁrm’s
social standing. For instance, a new venture may
have greater beneﬁts in institutional support from
an alliance with IBM or Microsoft than a partner
with similar status. Conversely, a well-established
and high-status ﬁrm may be more likely to favor
ﬁrms of similar status in its selection of alliance
partners, as an association with low-status ﬁrms
may result in a deterioration of its own perfor-
mance (Podolny, 1994). For example, Washington
and Zajac (2005) found that a high-status basket-
ball team is likely to erode its status through neg-
ative association with low-status basketball teams
in the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation) postseason basketball tournament. In other
words, a large status asymmetry in the alliance will
not help high-status ﬁrms, but boost the social rep-
utation and standing of low-status ﬁrms.
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, a large asym-
metry in societal status between a ﬁrm and its
alliance partners will bring more beneﬁt to the
ﬁrm with low rather than high societal status.
Hypothesis 3b: Ceteris paribus, a large asym-
metry in network status between a ﬁrm and its
alliance partners will bring more beneﬁt to the
ﬁrm with a low rather than a high network sta-
tus.
In addition to the interplay between resource
complementary and status association, there are
some boundary conditions that may constrain their
respective roles in ﬁrm performance. For instance,
it is not clear under what environmental condi-
tions the resource complementarity/status associ-
ation may have a larger payoff and which ﬁrms
can beneﬁt from it. To pursue further in this line,
we contend that it is necessary to investigate the
moderating effects of environment factors such as
environmental dynamism, and ﬁrm characteristics
such as ﬁrm age.
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The moderating effect of environmental
dynamism on resource complementarity
The importance of the ﬁt between ﬁrm strategy
and external environment has long been stressed in
the strategy literature. Environmental dynamism,
the degree of turbulence or instability in the com-
petitive environment, shapes the complexity of
decision making and accentuates ﬁrms’ organiza-
tional efﬁciencies (Dess and Beard, 1984; Hill and
Hoskisson, 1987; Jones and Hill, 1988). Specif-
ically, unpredictability in the environment will
increase the difﬁculty of realizing the potential
embedded in complementary resources. In con-
trast, in a stable environment ﬁrms will have less
pressure to ﬁnd right partners and to ensure the
smooth functioning of partner relations (Baum
et al., 2005; Hitt et al., 2000). As a result, we argue
that resource complementarity between partners
will generate more beneﬁts for ﬁrms in a stable
environment than in a dynamic environment. The
synergy creation between complementary partners
needs the support of predictable organizational
routines, stable information ﬂow, and smooth col-
laboration in alliances.
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, a ﬁrm’s high
degree of resource complementarity with its
alliance partners will bring more beneﬁt to its
performance in a stable environment than in a
dynamic environment.
The moderating effect of environmental
dynamism on status asymmetry
A large status asymmetry in alliances may have
distinctive performance implications under differ-
ent environmental conditions. We argue that envi-
ronmental dynamism will have opposing effects on
the two types of status.
We contend that a large asymmetry in societal
status is beneﬁcial for ﬁrm performance in a sta-
ble environment for two reasons. First, ﬁrms with
a low societal status will beneﬁt more from the
status spillover or endorsement from a ﬁrm with
high societal status when the environment has less
noise to affect the status spillover (Podolny, 1993,
1994). The stable relationship with high-status
partners will denote a long-term commitment from
both parties, and send a clear signal to the public
that these low-status ﬁrms are valuable partners
(Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000). Such status ben-
eﬁt, however, will be much less in a dynamic
environment where alliances are formed and ter-
minated at a very fast rate for short-term exploita-
tion purposes such as one-shot market transactions,
which may not confer much institutional endorse-
ment to partner ﬁrms. Second, ﬁrms with a high
societal status also beneﬁt more from a large
status asymmetry in a stable environment. In a
dynamic environment, ﬁrms with a high societal
status may not be able to easily identify valu-
able low-status partners due to managers’ bounded
rationality under more stressful conditions (Bour-
geois and Eisenhardt, 1988); however, this con-
cern will be alleviated in a stable environment,
allowing high-status ﬁrms to fully evaluate poten-
tial partners and extract the most rent from their
alliance relationships with low-status ﬁrms. Thus,
it is expected that a large asymmetry in soci-
etal status will bring higher performance for both
ﬁrms in a stable environment than in a dynamic
environment.
A large asymmetry in network status, on the
other hand, may be more beneﬁcial in a dynamic
environment. By deﬁnition, network status is about
a ﬁrm’s capability to access information, and a
central ﬁrm in an interﬁrm network will have a
high network status. Imagine that there are two
ﬁrms: one is in the central position of the net-
work, and the other is in a peripheral position of
the network. An alliance between these ﬁrms will
enable access to a wide spectrum of information,
including both the central and the peripheral chan-
nels, capturing rather complete information in the
network and helping ﬁrms to better deal with a
dynamic environment (Gnyawali and Madhavan,
2001; Lin et al., 2007). Conversely, if two ﬁrms
are both in a similar position in the network, their
information access may be constrained or overlap,
offering little help to face a dynamic environment
(Gulati, 1999; Stuart, 2000).
Hypothesis 5a: Ceteris paribus, a large asym-
metry in societal status between the ﬁrm and its
partners will beneﬁt the ﬁrm more in a stable
environment than in a dynamic environment.
Hypothesis 5b: Ceteris paribus, a large asym-
metry in network status between the ﬁrm and its
partners will beneﬁt the ﬁrm more in a dynamic
environment than in a stable environment.
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The moderating effect of ﬁrm age on status
asymmetry
Many researchers (e.g., Hagedoorn and Schaken-
raad, 1994) have explored the initial characteris-
tics of alliance partners in determining alliance
outcomes. Saxton (1997) argued that the charac-
teristics of the relationships between the ﬁrms as
an ongoing pattern should be the focal point for
understanding alliance behavior and outcomes. In
this study, we will examine the moderating effects
of newness on performance. We do so with a focus
on status asymmetry not only because of space
constraints for this article, but also because the
age effect on resource complementarity has been
more extensively investigated in the prior literature
(Baum et al., 2000).
Researchers have found that both the liability
of smallness (Baum and Oliver, 1991) and the
liability of newness (Carroll, 1983) increase the
mortality of new organizations; ‘the liability of
newness hypothesis assumes that a lack of social
approval, stability, and sufﬁcient resources typ-
iﬁes recent entrants into a population and that
these shortcomings increase their risk of failure’
(Baum and Oliver, 1991: 191). Young ﬁrms suffer
from inexperience as well as a lack of recogni-
tion and legitimacy. Baum et al. (2000) argued
that the development of an appropriate alliance
network at founding may enable a young ﬁrm to
enjoy relationships and resources typical of a more
established ﬁrm, overcoming the liabilities of new-
ness. Start-up ﬁrms can potentially access social,
technical, and commercial competitive resources
that normally require years of operating experi-
ence to acquire (Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000).
Stuart et al. (1999) also contended that technol-
ogy start-ups with prominent alliance or exchange
partners perform better than comparable ventures
without endorsements. A large status asymmetry
in alliances makes it possible for young ﬁrms to
tap into the resources of other high-ranking part-
ners, decrease the uncertainty, reduce the risk, and
increase the legitimacy of these young ﬁrms. The
larger the status asymmetry is in alliances, the
more status endorsement a young ﬁrm can bene-
ﬁt from it, whereas a large status asymmetry in
alliances may hurt the ranking of old ﬁrms. In
addition, the enhanced legitimacy as well as the
resource leverage will be much greater for young
ﬁrms than for established ﬁrms. From a differ-
ent angle, it may also be argued that there is a
ﬁrm-level boundary condition under which status
asymmetry may or may not help ﬁrm performance.
Hypothesis 6a: Ceteris paribus, a large asym-
metry in societal status between the ﬁrm and its
partners will beneﬁt a young ﬁrm more than an
old ﬁrm.
Hypothesis 6b: Ceteris paribus, a large asym-
metry in network status between the ﬁrm and its
partners will beneﬁt a young ﬁrm more than an
old ﬁrm.
METHODOLOGY
Sample
In this study, we identiﬁed a large sample from
four U.S. industries (computer, steel, pharmaceu-
ticals, crude petroleum and natural gas) over the
period of 1988–2000. Analysts classify industries
on multiple dimensions such as capital investment,
knowledge intensity, technological innovation, and
resource consumption (Todeva and Knoke, 2005).
The steel industry is recognized to be capital inten-
sive (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt, 2000),
while the computer industry is technology inten-
sive and relies on innovation for competitiveness.
Distinctive motives of ﬁrms in the petroleum and
natural gas industry condition their alliance partner
decisions and the types of alliances that they par-
ticipate in (Ernst and Steinhubl, 1997). Pharmaceu-
tical companies generally engage in dyadic bilat-
eral research and development alliances and do
not exhibit alliance blocks as seen in other indus-
tries (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Differences
in alliance formation strategies give us an excel-
lent opportunity to study alliance partner charac-
teristics in a broad range of industrial contexts.
The selection of these industries also allows us to
have a large variance of environmental dynamism,
enabling us to observe a full spectrum of its effect.
We examined ﬁrms’ alliance activities from the
13-year period, covering 41 ﬁrms in the computer,
43 in the steel, 55 in the pharmaceutical, and 56
in the petroleum industries. In total, there are 195
focal ﬁrms involved with 3,498 alliances in our
sample. These ﬁrms were randomly selected from
Standard & Poor’s Compustat (SPC);a n dMoody’s
FIS Online was used to complement ﬁrms’ ﬁnan-
cial data in SPC. There is a large variance of
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ﬁrm assets and sales across different industries.
For instance, ﬁrms’ total assets in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry range from 0.03 to 41,778.00 million
U.S. dollars (USD), while ﬁrms’ net sales vary
from 0.00 to 40,363.20 million USD. In the steel
industry, ﬁrms’ total assets range from 3.44 to
14,176.96 million USD, and net sales range from
3.81 to 14,220.71 million USD. Alliance data were
retrieved from SDC Platinum for each ﬁrm and
veriﬁed using Lexis-Nexis and Dow Jones News
Retrieval Service.
Measures
Dependent variable
Firm performance. The effects of alliances on
parent ﬁrms are multidimensional. Many empir-
ical studies show that alliances may contribute
to ﬁrm growth (Stuart, 2000), product innovative-
ness (Kotabe and Swan, 1995), reduced mortality
(Mitchell and Singh, 1996), and facilitated orga-
nizational learning (Hamel, 1991). In this study,
we have focused on the economic effect on par-
ent ﬁrms for ease of generalization and compari-
son with previous research. To capture economic
performance, researchers have adopted both per-
ceptual measures and objective measures. Percep-
tual measures have the merits of measuring over-
all performance from subjective indices, such as
partner’s expectation and strategic considerations
(Saxton, 1997). However, these perceptual mea-
sures are affected by different characteristics of
managers and their positions in organizations. Such
measures are more often subject to inconsistency
and ambiguity compared to the objective measures;
therefore, we chose to use an objective measure,
return on assets (ROA)2, to capture the economic
performance of parent ﬁrms in alliances.
Independent variables
Own societal status. To measure a focal ﬁrm’s
societal status, we used rankings from Fortune’s
annual list of ‘Most Admired Corporations’ (for
both America and the world) from 1988 to 2000.
While other rankings such as Fortune’s ‘Global
500’ ﬁrms and Standard & Poor’s industry surveys
2 We experimented with the adjusted ROA of each ﬁrm in
comparison to the industry ROA. The results have remained
consistent.
largely equate revenues and assets with repu-
tation, Fortune’s ‘Most Admired Corporations’
rankings are based on the average score of eight
explicit criteria that capture a ﬁrm’s social stand-
ing. These criteria include community and environ-
mental responsibility, innovativeness, long-term
investment value, ﬁnancial soundness, quality of
management, quality of products or services, abil-
ity to attract and keep talented people, and wise
use of corporate assets, all rated on a scale of 0
(poor) to 10 (excellent). Given that Fortune uses a
common set of criteria across different industries
and that our sample includes ﬁrms from four indus-
tries, we believe that these rankings offer a more
suitable basis for measuring societal status when
compared with other measures that are industry
speciﬁc.
Further, Fortune’s ‘Most Admired Corpora-
tions’ rankings are evaluated by experts who are
in a position to study and compare competitors
in each ﬁeld. These rankings are compiled each
year from a survey of over 8,000 senior exec-
utives, outside directors, and ﬁnancial analysts.
These rankings provide public certiﬁcation of a
ﬁrm’s societal status, and as a result the activi-
ties of these high-status players and their relations
with others can have great impact on an industry.
Thus, the national and global champions included
on Fortune’s ‘Most Admired Corporations’ rank-
ings enjoy high societal status. Speciﬁcally, own
societal status was coded as a dummy variable
(1 = high societal status, 0 = low societal status)
using either Fortune’s ‘America’s Most Admired
Corporations’ for U.S.-based ﬁrms, or Fortune’s
‘World’s Most Admired Companies’ for foreign-
based ﬁrms.
Fortune’s ‘America’s Most Admired Corpora-
tions’ rankings categorize ﬁrms into ‘most
admired’ and ‘least admired’ based on the scores
each ﬁrm received on a 10-point scale. We exam-
ined the scores from 1988 to 2000 and found that
companies with a score of 4.10 or above are usu-
ally accredited with the title of ‘Most Admired
Company.’ Accordingly, we treated all ﬁrms listed
in a particular year with an overall score of
4.10 or above as ﬁrms with high societal status
(own societal status = 1), while others (includ-
ing those that are in our sample but not listed
on Fortune’s lists) were considered as ﬁrms with
low societal status (ownsocietal status = 0). We
did not use a continuous measure of status here
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because of the ambiguous nuances among differ-
ent levels of status. Also, this dichotomous division
can address our research issue quite well.
In our sample of 195 ﬁrms, 10 are foreign-based.
Due to the fact that Fortune’s ‘The World’s Most
Admired Companies’ ranking was not available
before 1997, when coding a foreign-based focal
ﬁrm’s own societal status we had to use the 1997
list to map out ﬁrm status before 1997. To ensure
the validity, we compared the variation between
1988 and 1997 in ‘America’s Most Admired Cor-
porations.’ It exhibits little variation, as out of the
40 ranked U.S.-based ﬁrms from the computer,
pharmaceutical, petroleum, and steel industries that
were listed in 1988, 31 were still ranked as high-
status ﬁrms in 1997. More simply, 78 percent of
the ﬁrms from the industries under study ranked
in 1988 continued to be ranked in 1997. Further, a
supplementary test showed that the drop of these
10 foreign-based ﬁrms from our sample does not
affect our general ﬁndings.
Partner societal status. This was measured as a
focal ﬁrm’s total number of alliance partners with
high societal status divided by the total number
of alliance partners allied with the ﬁrm. The iden-
tiﬁcation of high-status partners is similar to that
of a focal ﬁrm using Fortune’s ‘Most Admired
Corporations’ rankings. Again, due to the unavail-
ability of Fortune’s ‘The World’s Most Admired
Companies’ rankings prior to 1997, we had to use
the ranking of 1997 as a proxy for foreign-based
partners from 1988 to 1996. To ensure the valid-
ity of this approach, we conducted similar checks
to that for own societal status. The test on 150
randomly selected ﬁrms from our sample revealed
that of the 340 foreign partners of these ﬁrms,
only 43 were ranked as having high societal sta-
tus prior to 1997, or 13 percent. This signiﬁcantly
reduces the chances that our measure would be
severely distorted by using the 1997 global list
as a proxy for previous years, although there is
a chance of under-ranking foreign-based partners
prior to 1997. For the years 1997 through 2000,
Fortune’s ‘The World’s Most Admired Compa-
nies’ for each of those years was used to rank focal
ﬁrms and their partners not based in the United
States.
The SDC database reports complete data for
new alliances announced each year, but not their
termination date. Scholars have argued that the life
span of alliances is no more than ﬁve years (Kogut,
1988). To ensure that we are capturing the status
effects of existing alliances, we used a ﬁve-year
moving window to calculate the ratio of high-status
alliance partners for each ﬁrm. We also used a
one-year lag, as this will allow us to more clearly
identify the effect of alliances on the focal ﬁrm’s
performance. For example, for the year of 2000 we
calculated both the total number of partners with
high societal status and total number of alliance
partners from 1995 through 1999.
Societal status asymmetry. We created this con-
struct for the societal status difference between a
focal ﬁrm and its partners, thereby capturing their
status interactions. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm is said to
have high societal status partners (coded as 1; oth-
erwise as 0) if its partners’ average societal status
score is at or above 0.50, the midpoint between
0 and 1. Societal status asymmetry was then cal-
culated as the absolute difference between a ﬁrm’s
own societal status and the above averaged partner
societal status.
Own network status. We measured the network
status using Bonacich’s (1987) eigenvector central-
ity in ﬁrms’ industry networks (Baum et al., 2005;
Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993). We constructed
yearly network matrices for each industry based
on the nondirectional alliance ties within each
industry. For instance, there are 1,205 alliances
formed by 41 focal ﬁrms in the computer indus-
try within our study period, involving 583 dif-
ferent alliance partners; we constructed a yearly
network matrix with 583 × 583 dimensions. Fol-
lowing Baum et al. (2005), we computed each
ﬁrm’s eigenvector centrality for each ﬁve-year net-
work and assigned the value to the ﬁnal year of
each ﬁve-year period. For instance, the 1992–1996
network was used to measure a ﬁrm’s centrality
for 1996, the 1993–1997 network for positions in
1997, and so forth. The centrality calculation was
conducted in Ucinet 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Free-
man, 2002).
Partner network status. We calculated partner
network status by looking at the network status of
a ﬁrm’s alliance partners based on the above ﬁve-
year moving window. As a ﬁrm may have multiple
alliances each year, we used the summed eigen-
vector centrality for all alliance partners divided
by the total number of alliance partners possessed
by the focal ﬁrm.
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Network status asymmetry.
We created this construct for the network status
difference between a focal ﬁrm and its partners.
Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm is argued to have partners of
high network status (coded as 1; otherwise as
0) if their average network status score is above
the midpoint of the full scale. Network status
asymmetry was then calculated as the absolute
difference between a ﬁrm’s own network status
and the above averaged partner network status.
For instance, if partners’ average network status
is at 20, above the midpoint of the status range
in the network, then this ﬁrm is claimed to have
alliance partners with high network status. If the
focal ﬁrm’s own network status is also high (above
the midpoint), then the network status asymmetry
between the ﬁrm and its partners is 0.
Resource complementarity. Prior research em-
ployed continuous measures derived from the Stan-
dard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code system
to operationalize business relatedness in corpo-
rate portfolios (Hoskisson et al., 1993). The SIC
approach, though with some limitations (Robins
and Wiersema, 1995), is still considered as an
effective way to map out the relatedness between
ﬁrms (e.g., Villalonga and McGahan, 2005).
Our measurement of resource complementarity
is based on a comparison between the focal ﬁrm’s
four-digit SIC code and that of its partners in
alliance relations. We ﬁrst counted the number of
partners that have different SIC codes from the
focal ﬁrm, and then divided that number by the
total number of alliance partners. For example,
if a ﬁrm has three partners among which one
having the same SIC code as the ﬁrm and the
other two having different SIC codes from the ﬁrm,
the resource complementarity measure between the
ﬁrm and it alliance partners will be 2/3 or 0.667.
Again, we used a ﬁve-year moving window.
We also experimented with the approach of
Wang and Zajac (2007) in measuring resource
complementarity. Based on a pilot sample of
the four industries, we found a correlation of
0.97 between their approach and our SIC-based
measure.
Environmental dynamism. Environmental dy-
namism was measured as the unpredictability of
the net sales of all ﬁrms in a four-digit SIC indus-
try. We followed Bergh and Lawless’s (1998)
approach and the basic equation was:
Yt = bo + b1t + at (1)
where Y = industry sales, t = year, and a =
residual. Dynamism was measured as the standard
error of the regression slope coefﬁcient divided
by the mean of sales to create a standardized
index of industry dynamism, and was calculated
by regression analyses in which the variable year
was regressed on the net industry sales variable
(Keats and Hitt, 1988). Five years of data were
used for each regression (e.g., net industry sales
values for 1983 through 1987 were used to pre-
dict volatility in 1988). Data for four-digit industry
sales were collected from COMPUSTAT. Larger
values of unpredictability indicated greater envi-
ronmental dynamism.
Control variables
Cumulative alliance numbers. These were cal-
culated as the total number of existing alliances
excluding the current year, in which ﬁrm perfor-
mance is measured for each ﬁrm. We also used
the ﬁve-year moving window to control for the
path-dependence effect.
Business diversiﬁcation. It has been well estab-
lished that a ﬁrm’s degree of business diversiﬁ-
cation affects its economic performance. We con-
trolled for a ﬁrm’s level of diversiﬁcation by using
the Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure (Jacquemin
and Berry, 1979), which is deﬁned as:
E =
n 
i=1
PI ln(1/Pi)( 2)
where Pi is the share of the ith segment in the total
sales of the ﬁrm, which operates in n segments.
The higher the index, the more diversiﬁed the ﬁrm.
Industry concentration. The extent of industry
competition may also affect ﬁrms’ risk orienta-
tion in their alliance formation. We controlled for
industry concentration, which was operationally
deﬁned as the percentage of top-four ﬁrms’ ship-
ments in a ﬁrm’s dominant industry.
Firm size. Size was measured as the number
of employees (in thousands). A ﬁrm’s size can
affect its market power and its ability to dominate
Copyright  2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 30: 921–940 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/smjAlliance Partners and Firm Performance 933
partners in alliances. Large ﬁrms are likely to
seek different types of characteristics in alliance
partners than smaller ﬁrms (Hitt et al., 2000).
Firm age. Age was measured by subtracting the
incorporated year from the alliance event year. It
is controlled because age difference will greatly
change the ultimate result of the alliance (Baum
et al., 2000).
Year. To control for the unobserved heterogeneity
during the study period, we coded the 13 years as
dummy variables.
Analysis
Since we have multiple observations/alliances for
each ﬁrm in our sample, we used the cross-
sectional time-series regression models with ﬁxed
effect to control for the interdependence among
clusters. Speciﬁcally, we used the command of
‘XTREG’ (with ﬁxed effect) in the STATA 8 pack-
age. XTREG ﬁts the cross-sectional time-series
regression model, which is represented by the fol-
lowing equation:
Rit = Xit × β + µi + εit (3)
where R is the ROA for ﬁrm i at time t; Xit
is a vector of characteristics of ﬁrm i at time
t, including resource complementarity, status, and
control variables; µi is a time-invariant ﬁrm i
effect, which can be treated as either ﬁxed or
random, respectively, in ﬁxed- or random-effects
models (equivalent to a ﬁrm-level dummy in ﬁxed-
effects models); and εit is an error term. Following
Aiken and West (1991), we also mean-centered the
variables before generating their interaction terms.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports the observation numbers, means,
standard deviations, and correlations for all the
independent variables and control variables. To
save space, the correlations for the year dummy
variable are not presented. Table 2 reports the
results of hierarchical cross-sectional time-series
regression on ﬁrm performance. Control variables
such as cumulative alliance number, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm
age, and environmental dynamism are entered in
the equation ﬁrst (Model 1). Since the inclusion
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Table 2. Hierarchical regression analysis with ﬁxed effect on ﬁrm performance
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Control variables
Cumulative alliance number 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm size 0.003
∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Business diversiﬁcation 0.15
∗∗ 0.12† 0.13† 0.14† 0.11 0.15
∗ 0.12†
Industry concentration 0.04 0.35 0.10 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.23
Firm age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Environmental dynamism −0.43† −0.67† −0.79
∗ −0.71
∗ −0.80 −0.50 −0.78
∗
Predictor variables
Resource complementarity −0.24
∗∗ −0.18 −0.18
∗ −0.25
∗ −0.22
∗ −0.20
∗
Own societal status 0.13 0.15† 0.24
∗∗ 0.15† 0.14† 0.19
∗
Own network status 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00
Partner societal status −0.40
∗∗∗ −0.44
∗∗ −0.64
∗∗∗ −0.45
∗∗ −0.44
∗∗ −0.43
∗∗
Partner network status −0.00 0.01
∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Societal status asymmetry 0.06 0.09 0.16
∗ 0.06 −0.00
∗ 0.08
Network status asymmetry −0.06 −0.06 −0.08 −0.08 −0.03 −0.07
Interactions
Resource complementarity × Partner
societal status
0.74
∗
Resource complementarity × Partner
network status
0.03
∗
Resource complementarity × Own
societal status
−0.48
∗
Resource complementarity × Own
network status
−0.01
∗
Societal status asymmetry × Own
societal status
−0.46
∗
Network status asymmetry × Own
network status
0.00
Resource complementarity ×
Environmental dynamism
−1.10†
Societal status asymmetry ×
Environmental dynamism
−1.32
∗
Network status asymmetry ×
Environmental dynamism
1.66
∗∗
Societal status asymmetry × Firm age −0.004†
Network status asymmetry × Firm
age
0.00
N 1487 718 718 718 718 718 718
F7 . 9 2
∗∗∗ 4.48
∗∗∗ 4.23
∗∗∗ 4.21
∗∗∗ 4.24
∗∗∗ 4.77
∗∗∗ 4.00
∗∗∗
R
2 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10
1. Year dummy variables were included, but not shown in the model. Dependent variable is return on assets.
2. †p<0.1; ∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001
of all interaction terms in one model may increase
multicolinearity, we added them into the regression
models separately in the order of hypotheses test-
ing. For example, Model 2 testiﬁes the relationship
stated in Hypothesis 1, Model 3 for Hypothesis 2,
and so forth. This approach has also been widely
adopted in prior research (e.g., Dowell and Swami-
nathan, 2006).
Hypotheses 1a and 1b argue that having alliance
partners with both resource complementarity and
high societal and/or network status will be pos-
itively associated with a ﬁrm’s performance. In
Model 2, the interaction effect of resource com-
plementarity and partner societal status is posi-
tively signiﬁcant at the p<0.05 level, so does
the interaction between resource complementarity
and partner network status. Therefore, Hypotheses
1a and 1b are supported.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b argue that the degree of
resource complementarity with alliance partners
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will improve the performance of a ﬁrm with low
societal/network status rather than that of a ﬁrm
with high societal and/or network status. In Model
3, the interaction effect of resource complementar-
ity and own societal/network status is negatively
signiﬁcant at the p<0.05 level, supporting both
Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b argue that ﬁrms with
a low societal and/or network status will bene-
ﬁt more from a large status asymmetry between
alliance partners. In Model 4, the interaction effect
between societal status asymmetry and own soci-
etal status is negatively signiﬁcant at the p<
0.05 level, supporting Hypothesis 3a; however, the
interaction between network status asymmetry and
own network status is not signiﬁcant, failing to
support Hypothesis 3b and revealing potential dif-
ferences between the two types of status.
In Hypothesis 4 we argue that a ﬁrm’s high
degree of resource complementarity with its
alliance partners will bring more beneﬁt to its
performance in a stable environment than in a
dynamic environment. In Model 5, the interaction
term between resource complementarity and envi-
ronmental dynamism is negatively signiﬁcant at the
p<0.10 level, supporting Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5a contends that a large asymmetry
in societal status between the ﬁrm and its partners
will beneﬁt the ﬁrm more in a stable environment
than in a dynamic environment. The interaction
between societal status asymmetry and environ-
mental dynamism in Model 6 is negatively signif-
i c a n ta tt h ep<0.05 level, supporting Hypothesis
5a; however, in Hypothesis 5b we argue for a dif-
ferent effect of the interaction between network
status asymmetry and environmental dynamism.I t s
positively signiﬁcant effect at the p<0.01 level
in Model 6 suggests that a large asymmetry in
network status between the ﬁrm and its partners
will beneﬁt the ﬁrm more in a dynamic environ-
ment than in a stable environment, in support of
Hypothesis 5b.
In Hypothesis 6a we argue that a large asymme-
try in societal status will signiﬁcantly improve the
performance of a young ﬁrm. In Model 7 the inter-
action between societal status asymmetry and ﬁrm
age is negatively signiﬁcant at the p<0.10 level,
supporting Hypothesis 6a. Hypothesis 6b argues
for a similar relationship for network status asym-
metry; however, the interaction between network
status asymmetry and ﬁrm age is not signiﬁcant,
and Hypothesis 6b is not supported. A summary of
the hypotheses testing results is listed in Table 3.
To provide additional conﬁrmation for the inter-
action terms, we also plotted them in Figure 1.
To save space, we only presented four interaction
plots. For instance, Panel A and Panel B report
consistent ﬁndings with the regression table, sup-
porting Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Similarly, Panel C
provides support for Hypothesis 3a, and Panel D
for Hypothesis 5b.
DISCUSSION
Our study examines the two seemingly differ-
ent needs in alliance partner selection and relates
them to parent ﬁrms’ performance. Speciﬁcally,
our study demonstrates that the economic ratio-
nale for resources and the sociological justiﬁ-
cation for status-seeking are not contradictory,
but rather complementary to each other, which
requires an integrated approach to better under-
stand ﬁrm performance. Our integrative framework
provides much-needed details and insights into the
exchange mechanisms between resources and sta-
tus. Our analyses on thousands of alliances in four
industries over 13 years suggest that what mat-
ters in alliances not only rests on resource con-
siderations, but also on institutional explanations.
Further, a proper combination between resources
and status predicts a higher performance. Con-
tingencies as well as distinctive aspects of sta-
tus also need to be considered when we apply
the integrated approach, which offers improved
explanatory power for predicting sustained beneﬁts
to alliance partners. In particular, having alliance
partners with high resource complementarity will
boost ﬁrm performance when those partners also
have high network status. A ﬁrm’s status is not
at odds with the resource consideration in alliance
relationships; intangible institutional beneﬁts may
affect ﬁrm performance by improving the resource
ﬂow in both quality and quantity.
Our study further suggests that resource comple-
mentarity also interacts with a ﬁrm’s own status.
Firms with low societal and/or network status will
beneﬁt more from partners with resource comple-
mentarity, while ﬁrms with high societal and/or
network status will be less likely to do so. In addi-
tion to the beneﬁts of associating with partners
with an absolute level of status, our study also
calls attention to the status asymmetry in alliance
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Table 3. Summary of hypotheses and empirical conclusions
Hypothesis Expected
sign
Empirical
conclusions
Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, a high degree of resource complementarity with alliance
partners will be positively associated with a ﬁrm’s performance when the partners
also have high societal status.
+ Supported
Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris paribus, a high degree of resource complementarity with alliance
partners will be positively associated with a ﬁrm’s performance when the partners
also have high network status.
+ Supported
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, a high degree of resource complementarity with alliance
partners will improve the performance of a ﬁrm with low rather than high societal
status.
− Supported
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, a high degree of resource complementarity with alliance
partners will improve the performance of a ﬁrm with low rather than high network
status.
− Supported
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, a large asymmetry in societal status between a ﬁrm and
its alliance partners will bring more beneﬁt to the ﬁrm with low rather than high
societal status.
− Supported
Hypothesis 3b: Ceteris paribus, a large asymmetry in network status between a ﬁrm and
its alliance partners will bring more beneﬁt to the ﬁrm with low rather than high
network status.
− Not supported
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, a ﬁrm’s high degree of resource complementarity with its
alliance partners will bring more beneﬁt to its performance in a stable environment
than in a dynamic environment.
− Supported
Hypothesis 5a: Ceteris paribus, a large asymmetry in societal status between the ﬁrm
and its partners will beneﬁt the ﬁrm more in a stable environment than in a dynamic
environment.
− Supported
Hypothesis 5b: Ceteris paribus, a large asymmetry in network status between the ﬁrm
and its partners will beneﬁt the ﬁrm more in a dynamic environment than in a stable
environment.
+ Supported
Hypothesis 6a: Ceteris paribus, a large asymmetry in societal status between the ﬁrm
and its partners will beneﬁt a young ﬁrm more than an old ﬁrm.
− Supported
Hypothesis 6b: Ceteris paribus, a large asymmetry in network status between the ﬁrm
and its partners will beneﬁt a young ﬁrm more than an old ﬁrm.
− Not supported
relationships. A large status asymmetry, especially
in terms of societal status, will bring more bene-
ﬁts for ﬁrms with low status, shedding light on the
often-debated issue of who reaps the most beneﬁt
in alliance relations (Das et al., 1998; Thye, 2000).
In addition to examining the interactions
between the resource-based view and the institu-
tional perspective, we have also identiﬁed some
important moderating factors that may delineate
their respective theoretical boundaries. Our study
shows that a stable environment, rather than a
dynamic environment, will facilitate the synergy
creation between ﬁrms with resource complemen-
tarity in alliances. We differentiate two types of
status: societal vs. network. Our study suggests
that the two types of status can have their dis-
tinctive roles and unique boundary conditions. For
example, we ﬁnd that because of the different
nature of societal and network status, a large asym-
metry in societal status will be beneﬁcial in a stable
environment, while a large asymmetry in network
status will help ﬁrms in a dynamic environment.
Contributions
Our research makes several major contributions to
the strategic management literature. First, it is one
of the ﬁrst attempts to integrate the resource-based
view and the institutional perspective in address-
ing the consequences of alliance partner selections.
Although each perspective has been intensively
explored in the literature, an interaction mecha-
nism between them has rarely been investigated.
Our integrative approach suggests that alliance
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Figure 1. Interaction plots
behavior is a function of both resources and status
seeking. Resource demand itself fails to capture the
intercorrelated relationships among partners in the
institutional environment. The status need interacts
with the resource demand in alliances, and such
interactions have a strong positive bearing on the
ultimate performance for parent ﬁrms.
Second, our integrative approach reveals a pos-
sible source for ﬁrms to obtain valuable resources
for sustained competitive advantage. Porter argued
that RBV fails to answer ‘What is a unique
resource? What makes it valuable? Why was a ﬁrm
able to create or acquire it?’ (Porter, 1991: 108).
Our integrated approach shows that status can also
be a valuable and rare social resource and that it
needs to be jointly considered along with ﬁnan-
cial and physical resources to better understand
the performance consequences of ﬁrms’ partner-
ing choices. In particular, young ﬁrms can have
access to this valuable resource by allying with
high-status partners.
Third, we have differentiated two important
types of status (societal vs. network status) and
highlighted their distinct roles under different con-
texts. Although research in sociology and strategy
areas has widely acknowledged the importance of
status, a common understanding of what constitutes
status is both lacking and sometimes even confus-
ing. Our research contributes to a better under-
standing of these constructs and shows that it is
important to differentiate them theoretically and
empirically. While our study ﬁnds some shared
nature between these two types of status in their
interaction with resource complementarity, we also
ﬁnd different effects in certain conditions. Firms
with a low societal status will beneﬁt from a large
status asymmetry, while ﬁrms with a low network
status may not be able to extract value from a
large status asymmetry. More interestingly, we ﬁnd
that a large asymmetry in societal status will have
more beneﬁts in a stable environment than in a
dynamic environment, while a large asymmetry in
network status will be more beneﬁcial in a dynamic
environment. These interesting ﬁndings show that
future research along this direction will be war-
ranted.
Limitations and directions for future research
Although this study has endeavored to advance the
alliance literature, the ﬁndings should be consid-
ered in light of its limitations. The ﬁrst limitation
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is that certain more in-depth organizational factors,
such as organizational learning, organizational ﬁt,
and compatibility (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997), are
not included in this study due to the accessibility of
data. A further study may include these variables
and test their interactive effects on performance.
Second, only ROA is used to test the proﬁtability
of parent ﬁrms in this study. Other measures such
as return on investment and Tobin’s q can be
adopted to further examine this synthesized model.
Although other measures may provide additional
insights to the study, we expect that the main effect
will remain the same.
A third limitation lies in the sample selection.
Although the ﬁrms are selected randomly from
four industries in Standard & Poor’s Compustat
(SPC) database, SPC doesn’t include many small
ﬁrms in this database. At the same time, ﬁrms that
do not have economic data for the full 13 years
are excluded from this study. This will lead to
potential truncation bias toward those ﬁrms that
exited in this period.
Future research could examine the applicabil-
ity of the integrated model in different settings,
such as domestic and global environments. It will
be interesting to extend both RBV and the insti-
tutional perspective into the international context
and to examine their joint effect on alliance for-
mation. Peng (2001) also proposed that more RBV
work should be devoted to emerging economies by
drawing on the rich insights of the institutional per-
spective. As institutional transition calls for signif-
icant changes in strategic choices, alliance forma-
tion pattern is expected to vary with the different
institutional environments and resource demands
across the world (Lin et al., 2009).
CONCLUSION
This study departs from the existing research by
integrating RBV and the institutional perspective
in alliance partner selection processes, and inves-
tigates the interactive effects of resources and two
important types of status on parent ﬁrms’ perfor-
mance. It shows that an in-depth understanding
of the exchange mechanism between the needs of
resource efﬁciency and social recognition is not
only necessary, but also feasible through an inte-
grated approach. These two needs, with their own
boundary conditions, interact with each other and
have a strong bearing on ﬁrm performance.
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